This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy, as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects...

Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one- dimensional characteristics space. We show that standard results on prices and locations no longer hold when firms compete in a multi- characteristics space. In the location game with n characteristics, firms choose to...

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the contrary holds when the technology is constant.

We investigate the effects of forward looking behavior in technology adoption. The setup is an overlapping generation model where agents choose between two alternative networks taking in consideration both the installed base and the expected base. The latter element is the distinctive feature of...

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries and immigrants that come from "the rest of the world".The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias toward immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and...

In this paper we review some of the literature on R&D collective arrangements using game theoretical concepts and considering various settings, involving either complete or incomplete contracts. Patent protection, licensing in various industry contexts as well as the role of various factors such...

We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementarity activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources...

In a linear model ofcost reducing R&D/Cournot competition, firm asymmetry is shown to be sustainable as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with R&D competition only ifthe productivity of research is sufficiently large relative to the benefits from imitation. In such a case, industry-wide cost...

In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the possible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form. The all pay auction approach allows us...

We develop an overlapping generations model, where firms (as consumers) have a two-period life, investing in R&D during the first period and competing in the product market in the second period. The number of firms is endogenously determined and the set of successful firms by a Bernoullian...