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Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

learn and potentially improve their relative position in terms of performance. We find that people express a taste for … status. People increase their effort when they are informed about their relative performance, and some individuals pay to … sabotage others' output or to artificially increase their own performance although they are paid a flat wage. Introducing the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833344

Organizational Redesign, Information Technologies and Workplace Productivity

Dostie, Benoit; Jayaraman, Rajshri - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

Using a large longitudinal, nationally representative workplace-level dataset, we explore the productivity gains associated with computer use and organizational redesign. The empirical strategy involves the estimation of a production function, augmented to account for technology use and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100694

Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its workers piece rates. We provide a framework within which observed productivity differences can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in ability and the other due to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100605

Development of Measures to Assess Dimensions of IS Operation Transactions

Aubert, Benoit A.; Patry, Michel; Rivard, Suzanne - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1995

Information Systems (IS) researchers often rely on organizational economics models to describe and explain various IS management issues. While those models are found to be useful, measures are yet to be proposed to assess the dimensions of IS transactions. In this paper, we present the results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100615

Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility

Boyer, Marcel; Robert, Jacques - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1996

Our objective in this paper is to illustrate and better understand the unavoidable arbitrage between incentives and flexibility in contexts of asymmetric information and to characterize the general features of an appropriate response to this challenge. We show that procedures and institutions in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100623

Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records

Ferrall, Christopher; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1994

We apply agency theory to the payroll records of a copper mine that paid a production bonus to teams of workers. As with most incentive pay used by firms, the bonus was simpler in form than the optimal contract that balances incentives, insurance, and free-riding. We explore whether transactions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100684

Fixed Wages, Piece Rates, and Intertemporal Productivity: A Study of Tree Planters in British Columbia

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

We examine the effects of different sequences of work and rest on the daily productivity of workers who planted trees in the province of British Columbia, Canada, comparing the intertemporal productivity profiles of planters who were paid either fixed wages or piece rates. We find that planters...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100685

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

Data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment was conducted within a tree-planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both copensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100753

On the Elasticity of Effort for Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

If policy prescriptions for compensation systems are to be useful, then they must be based on the empirical analysis of incentive effects; i.e., the elasticity of worker effort with respect to changes in the compensation system. We measure the elasticity of worker effort with respect to changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100762

Compensation Policy and Worker Performance: Identifying Incentive Effects from Field Experiments

Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

The role of field experiments in evaluating the effect of compensation policies on worker productivity is considered. Particular attention is paid to the ability of a field experiment to identify the effect of a permanent change in firm policy. While field experiments solve endogeneity problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100968