This paper employs the methodology of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate under what conditions trust can be viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents adapt their trust in a partner, the weight...

This paper investigates the role of feedback quality and voice in performance evaluation. A model is developed and tested in which feedback quality and voice enhance procedural fairness perceptions (procedure effects), and procedural fairness perceptions in turn lead to different positive...

This article examines the alleged links between 'partnership' forms of managing workplace relationships in Britain, and the development of intra-organisational 'trust'. The potential for mutually complementary linkages between the two are clear, in theory at least: partnership, as defined here,...

This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. Two kinds of relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk....

There is a tendency to see trust and control by formal agreements as substitutes. According to transaction cost economics trust is unreliable, and some form of control is needed to reduce hazards of opportunism. According to others, high trust allows for a limited extent of formal control....