This paper presents a neural network based methodology for examining the learning of game-playing rules in never-before seen games. A network is trained to pick Nash equilibria in a set of games and then released to play a larger set of new games. While faultlessly selecting Nash equilibria in...

This paper considers the use of neural networks to model bounded rational behaviour. The underlying theory and use of neural networks is now a component of various forms of scientific enquiry, be it modelling artificial intelligence, developing better pattern recognition or solving complex...

Renewable energy sources have a critical role to play in contributing to the diversity, sustainability and security of energy supplies. The main objectives of the paper is to gain an understanding of UK households’preferences for the type of mechanism that is used to support renewables. Two...

In financial markets with asymmetric information, traders may have an incentive to forgo profitable deals today in order to preserve their informational advantage for future deals. This sort of manipulative behaviour has been studied in markets with one informed trader (Kyle 1985, Chakraborty...

Rational herd behavior and informationally efficient security prices have long been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we describe the conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary and sufficient for informational herding and...

Relying on University of Michigan data on consumers.in.ation expectations, we establish some stylized facts on the process of in.ation expectation formation across different demographic groups. Percentile time series models are employed to test for rationality and to study learning dynamics...

We study equilibrium retention rules in a dynamic common agency game. The decision to reappoint or not is made by a committee consisting of two principals: the retention decision is uncertain if the two principals disagree. We demonstrate that all equilibrium paths exhibit what we call strategic...