The authors study a dynamical model of interconnected firms which allows for certain market imperfections and frictions, restricted here to be myopic price forecasts and slow adjustment of production. Whereas the standard rational equilibrium is still formally a stationary solution of the...

In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. It is shown that as a result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, even at Walrasian prices, a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no...

In a simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K < S firms - and thus potentially incomplete markets-, rates of super majority rule p€[1/2, 1] are computed which guarantee the existence of p -majority stable production equilibria : within each firm, no alternative production plan can rally a proportion bigger than p of the shareholders, or shares (depending on the governance), against the equilibrium. The smallest p are obtained for announced production plans whose span contains the ideal consumptions of all K mean shareholders. This is done under various governances. These rates of super majority are shown to be always smaller than Caplin and Nalebuff (1988, 1991) bound of 1-1/e ~ 0.64. Moreover, simple majority production equilibria are shown to exist for any initial distribution of types when K=S-1, and for symmetric distributions of types as soon as K > S/2. Finally, through parametric examples, these rates are shown to decrease with the homogeneity of the shareholders' beliefs on the probabilities of the states of nature, and to increase with the shareholders'...</s>

An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of...

In absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.