Monopsonistic wage-setting power requires that the supply of labor directed toward individual establishments is upward sloping. This paper utilizes institutional features to identify the supply curve. The elasticity of labor supply is estimated using data for the Norwegian teacher labor market...

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market. We show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment...

Monopsonistic wage-setting power requires that the supply of labor directed toward individual establishments is upward sloping. This paper utilizes institutional features to identify the supply curve. The elasticity of labor supply is estimated using data for the Norwegian teacher labor market...

Monopsonistic wage-setting power requires that the supply of labor directed toward individual establishments is upward sloping. This paper utilizes institutional features to identify the supply curve. The elasticity of labor supply is estimated using data for the Norwegian teacher labor market...

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market. We show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment...

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market. We show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment...