For a large global economy with normal goods, and an unequal world income distribution, we consider the endogenous formation and stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) under nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Nations share green R&D efforts and enjoy R&D spillovers...

Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence show that leadership behavior in climate policy through increased abatement efforts or international transfers cannot be expected to be very successful. In this paper we instead show that pioneering activities, which are based on green technological...

Encouraging innovation is an important part of environmental policy. A large literature in environmental economics examines the links between environmental policy and innovation. This paper reviews recent literature on green innovation. I highlight major trends in the literature, including an...

From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need...

This policy note investigates whether the current level of public support to environment-friendly technologies is sufficient to allow European countries to respond to the multiple challenges posed by climate change and other environmental concerns. We first lay out the justifications for...

Global climate change and other environmental challenges require the development of new energy technologies with lower emissions. In the near-term, R&D investments, either by government or the private sector, can bring down the costs of these lower emission technologies. However, the results of...

The mix of public and private research funding investments in alternative energy presents a challenge for isolating the effect of government R&D funding. Factors such as energy prices and environmental policy influence both private and public R&D decisions. Moreover, because government R&D is...

In a domestic market, a duopoly produces a homogeneous final good, pollution, pollution abatement and R&D. One of the firms (foreign) has superior technology. The government regulates the duopoly by levying a pollution tax to maximize domestic welfare. We consider the potential implementation of...

Environmental regulations have consistently been found to spur innovation in "clean" technologies, with one significant exception. Past cap-and-trade programs have encouraged adoption of existing pollution control technologies, but had little effect on innovation. Several explanations have been...

We study optimal pollution abatement under a mixed oligopoly game when firms engage in emissions-reducing R&D that is imperfectly appropriable. The regulator uses a tax to curb emissions. Results show that in a mixed oligopoly, the public firm has positive emissions reduction in equilibrium;...