This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess capacity.

This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess capacity.

We analyze the capacity choice of firms in a long-run mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantity but also capacity scale. Our main purpose is to show that while a profit-maximizing firm maintains over capacity as a strategic device, a firm pursuing non-pure profit...

This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the...

This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the...

We analyze the capacity choice of firms in a long-run mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantity but also capacity scale. Our main purpose is to show that while a profit-maximizing firm maintains over capacity as a strategic device, a firm pursuing non-pure profit...