The domestic brand bias has been one of the most commonly used explanations for automobiles price differences across international borders in the EU. Using a panel dataset comprising of 51 models across 21 EU member states, we take advantage of cross country heterogeneity, and find that,...

We study collusion between price discriminating firms which are asymmetrically located in a linear city. We obtain that higher distance increases the sustainability of the collusive agreement for any degree of spatial asymmetry, and more spatial symmetry between firms increases collusion...

The domestic brand bias has been one of the most commonly used explanations for automobiles price differences across international borders in the EU. Using a panel dataset comprising of 51 models across 21 EU member states, we take advantage of cross country heterogeneity, and find that,...

This note extends the characterization of simultaneous investment (tacit collusion) equilibria in Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2012). Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...

We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a two-stage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.