We establish four necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the Averch-Johnson effect in a generalized version of their famous model of the rate-of-return regulated firm. The four necessary and sufficient conditions are then compared to the two stronger sufficient conditions for...

A matching model, combined with a shirking model of efficiency wages, is examined. It depends on sources of unemployment variation whether the no-shirking condition (NSC) tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower. When only productivity varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the...

While Gibrat's Law assumes that growth rate variance is independent of size, empirical work has usually found a negative relationship between growth rate variance and firm growth. Using data on French manufacturing firms, we observe a relatively low, but statistically significant, negative...

We establish four necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the Averch-Johnson effect in a generalized version of their famous model of the rate-of-return regulated firm. The four necessary and sufficient conditions are then compared to the two stronger sufficient conditions for...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

This paper examines how the model of De Fraja [Games and Economic Behavior, 1999] can be amended after Che [Games and Economic Behavior, 2000] negative result. We mainly show that the optimal level of investments can be obtained with the specific performance contract considered by De Fraja if...

We construct a new database by matching firm-level Compustat data to NBER patent data, for four 2-digit complex technology sectors. Whilst conventional regression estimators show that the stock market does recognise efforts at innovation, quantile regression analysis adds a new dimension to the...

We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no...

If the public and private firm have mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move game, Choi (2006) analyzes that the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an inefficient level with the monopoly of private firm even if there are Nash equilibria. However, we find that if we use equilibrium...

Assuming a fixed-proportion downstream production technology, partial forward integration by an upstream monopolist may be observed whether the monopolist is advantaged or disadvantaged cost-wise relative to fringe firms in the downstream market. Integration need not induce cost-predation and...