I investigate R&D efforts for process innovation in a monopoly with uncertain demand. Two different models are proposed, where either (i) the reservation price is affected by an additive shock and the marginal production cost is increasing, or (ii) a multiplicative shock on the slope of demand...

To spur innovation, the patent protection system grants the patentee limited monopoly power to recoup his R&D investment, although, in general, allowing the use of the public good "innovation" is socially efficient. But patents and patent threats can also be used strategically, e.g. to deter...

Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) pointed out that patents may be inferior to other forms of intellectual property in that the independent invention is not a defence to infringement. The authors' analysis refers to situations in which there is an unlimited number of potential entrants by independent...

This paper compares alternative licensing schemes of a patentor, that is, at the same time, a producer within an industry. The licensing scheme can assume the form of a royalty per unit of output, a fixed fee, or a fixed fee with maximum authorized production. We show that, when the innovation...

This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.

Although regulatory authorities are putting more emphasis to the long-run effects of mergers and acquisitions due to their effects on innovation, several merger proposals have been challenged due to their adverse innovation effects. In a simple model with endogenous R&D investment, we show that...

We show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection.

To spur innovation, the patent protection system grants the patentee limited monopoly power to recoup his R&D investment, although, in general, allowing the use of the public good "innovation" is socially efficient. But patents and patent threats can also be used strategically, e.g. to deter...

This note shows that the fixed fee oligopolistic license model developed by Kamien and Tauman (1986) yields the result that the private returns from innovation can be greater than the social returns when the number of firms in the industry is equal to or larger than 3. This result implies that...

This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.