I develop a semi-structural approach to identify network effects on two-sided monopoly platforms without data on prices and quantities. When total revenue data is available, the test is sufficient. When separate revenue data is available on the two sides, the test is both necessary and sufficient.

We propose and test hypotheses about three endogenous mechanisms that may be driving the observed network structure of producers’ markets. We use data that we have collected on collaborative network ties among producers. Estimates of Exponential Random Graphs Models (ERGM) support our hypotheses.

Laitinen (1980) derives an input allocation model for a multiproduct firm that first maximizes revenue and second maximizes profit. While theoretically elegant, the model has never been formulated empirically because of the complexity of the model’s price-deflated terms. This paper derives the...

This paper studies the discriminatory pricing of an intermediate good and compares two models with a different timing of investments undertaken by the downstream firms, before or after the upstream monopolist sets the input prices. When the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher...

We propose a dynamic model of a patent portfolio race in an industry in which innovation is incremental. Two firms compete in prices and in research. We study the Markov perfect (closed-loop) equilibrium of the resulting differential game, identifying a steady state in which firms compete neck...

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining...

This paper shows that large labour unions reduce the incentive for uncoordinated monetary policies to improve the terms of trade. This finding implies that concentrated labour markets significantly affect the optimal policy prescription in an open economy.

We model adoption and diffusion in a commons under uncertainty about a technology’s value. Technological resource stock externalities make technology less valuable with depleted stocks, but transmit information about a new technology’s value, causing faster adoption of high-value technologies.

We investigate the relationship between tournament prices and effort choices in the presence of favoritism. High tournament prizes can decrease agents’ effort supply when the choice of the winner is not perfectly objective but affected to some extent by personal preferences of an evaluator.