We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and...

This article proposes a theory of banking of emission permits under conditions of regulatory uncertainty. Based on a two-period partial equilibrium framework, we examine the effects of increasing risk - in the sense of a mean-preserving spread - regarding a future permits allocation at the...

This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France. Even though a rights offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly using the relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity issues is...

In this article, we investigate the relevance of the glass ceiling hypothesis in France, according to which there exist larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution. Using a matched worker-firm data set of about 1 30 000 employees and 14 000 employers, we estimate quantile...

This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection,...

The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise standard competitive complete markets discrete time economy. The construction of a consensus belief, as well as a consensus consumer are shown to be valid modulo a predictable aggregation bias, which takes the...

The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete.