We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. The regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose. When there is private information only about costs, the firm should always have a degree of discretion...

The Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule states that it is efficient to set the price of access to an essential facility equal to the direct cost of access plus the opportunity cost to the integrated access provider. The authors analyze the relevant notion of 'opportunity cost' under...

This note extends the analysis of M. Armstrong, C. Doyle, and J. Vickers (1996) to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost; that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price...

This paper analyzes some effects of price discrimination policy in a model where a dominant incumbent firm faces an endogenous degree of competition in one of its two markets. Banning price discrimination tends to encourage more entry, which is desirable if the entrant is as efficient as the...

A simple duopoly model is used to show the advantage to a manufacturer of se lling his product through an independent retailer (vertical separatio n) rather than directly to consumers (vertical integration). Vertical separation is profitable insofar as it induces more friendly behavio r from the...

This short essay introduces a special issue of The Journal of Industrial Economics on vertical relationships, including both vertical integration and vertical restraints. In the last few years, there has been a resurgence of theoretical and empirical work on vertical relationships, and they are...