Based on empirical data, a two-equation game-type corruption reaction function model was developed. A data to model approach was used rather than the usual a priori approach. The general hypothesis tested was the monkey see, monkey do principle. The latest data on corruption among developing...

A simple micro model of a firm's investment decision made under the uncertainty of the success of a bribe of a government official is developed. The probability of success of the bribe is a function of the amount paid to the official to get things done. The operational model runs the amount of...

In this paper, a simple dynamic model of efficient firm-level managerial resource allocation to two uses, one involving productivity activities and another one involving corruption activities to get things done was developed. The model follows the optimal control theory process. Two operational...

We provide a theory of how growth, corruption, and a low-powered public-sector pay scale coexist in a stable equilibrium in the early stage of China's development. The regionally decentralized authoritarian regime of China features lower-level government officials competing for promotion to a...

In this paper, we analyze how the offshoring of services by Swedish firms is affected by corruption in target economies. The results suggest that firms avoid corrupt countries and that corruption reduces the amount of offshored services. In addition, the sensitivity to corruption is highest for...

In this paper, we analyze if the enterprise decision to invest in a corrupt market is affected by its experience of other corrupt markets. Our conjecture is that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can learn how to navigate corrupt environments and reduce their corruption-related market entry...