This article analyzes the "escape from competition effect" in a step-by-step framework in which a succesful firm may either leapfrog the previous leader or catch-up its technology. Innovation and growth are affected by both the intensity of competition and the probability of leapfrogging.

This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a …fixed fee when her innovation is covered by a weak patent, i.e. a patent that is likely to be invali- dated by a court if challenged. Using a general model where the nature of competition is not speci…ed, we show...

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated producers. First order price discrimination leading to personalized prices are the perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game where firms choose at the first stage to commit or not to a uniform price and compete...

Economic theory views patents as policy instruments aimed at fostering innovation and diffusion. Three major implications are drawn regarding current policy debates. First, patents may not be the most effective means of protection for inventors to recover R&D investments when imitation is costly...

This paper investigates the choice of an intellectual protection regime for a process innovation. We set up a multi-stage model in which choosing between patent and trade secrecy is affected by three parameters : the patent strength defined as the probability that the right is upheld by the...

L'article analyse les complémentarités et les tensions entre la concurrence et l'innovation tant du point de vue des instruments d'analyse que du point de vue des politiques économiques.

This article analyzes the "escape from competition effect" in a step-by-step framework in which a succesful firm may either leapfrog the previous leader or catch-up its technology. Innovation and growth are affected by both the intensity of competition and the probability of leapfrogging.

The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of...

In this paper, we revisit the issue of licensing ‘weak' patents under the shadow of litigation. Departing from the seminal paper by Farrell and Shapiro [2008], we consider innovations of any size and not only ‘small' innovations, and we allow the number of licensees to be less than the...

This article shows how European courts have managed tensions between antitrust and intellectual protection in three areas: (1) Parallel imports and market segmentation; (2) Refusals to supply essential inputs protected by patents and copyrights; (3) Forms of conduct by copyright collectives.