Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...

Our earlier papers had extended to asymmetric information some classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew at the outset which price would prevail tomorrow on each spot market. Yet, observation...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...

The paper analyzes how uncertainty on traders' participation affects a competitive security market in which there are some informed traders. We show that discontinuities, or "crashes", can arise at equilibrium, even when no investor posts a priori an increasing demand. Because of uncertain...

Official Development Aid allows are volatile, non-predictable and not delivered in a transparent way. All these features reinforce asymmetric information between the citizens and the recipient government about the amount of aid flows received by developing countries. This article uses a...

This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers control by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more...

Our earlier papers [2,3,4,5,6] had extended to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory [1,7,10], under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete markets with nominal assets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (3) introduced refined concepts of "no-arbitrage" prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information. We now present the model with numeraire assets and study its...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete nominal-asset markets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre [3] introduced refined concepts of "no-arbitrage" prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information setting the classical concepts of symmetric information. In...

We study the optimal contracts (payment and extraction path) implemented by a regulator unable to commit to long term contracts that delegates the extraction of a nonrenewable resource to a firm. The regulator wishes to maximize the tax revenue and does not know the firm's efficiency which is...