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IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774091
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A SET-THEORETIC APPROACH TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES: PART 1.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774099
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Information Partitions and the Logic of Knowledge and Common Knowledge.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474453
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THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL PLAY IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474464
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GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474477
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KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656801
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IF HE DOES NOT KNOW. WILL HE KNOW THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW?
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618204