Note: The following is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract as it appeared in the print journal. I study the pollution control problem faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) that wants to design an international environmental agreement...

We study the task faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) with limited funds that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (IEA) for less developed countries (LDCs). The SNGA can't contract directly with polluting firms in the various...

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) with restricted funds that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (IEA) for less developed countries (LDCs). The SNGA can't contract directly with polluting firms in the...

This paper analyzes the problem faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) with restricted funds that wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) for developing countries (DCs). The SNGA contracts with polluting firms through their...

We study the decision question faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) that intends to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). This SNGA can't interact directly with the externality causing firms in the developing countries (DCs), and it must...