We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation...

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be...

The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on a certain issue. It is assumed that each agent is inclined to make a particular decision, but due to a possible influence of the others, his final decision may be different from his initial inclination. Since in...

This paper studies how the imperfect collateral assignments of patents contribute to "deep pockets'' savings of innovative firms facing random investment opportunities in research and development (R&D) and determine the growth of their innovations, using a version of the Kiyotaki and Moore...

The paper concerns a dynamic model of influence in which agents have to make a yes-no decision. Each agent has an initial opinion, which he may change during different phases of interaction, due to mutual influence among agents. The influence mechanism is assumed to be stochastic and to follow a...

Cet article présente un cas particulier de régression non fondée, lorsqu'une variable dépendante a un coefficient de corrélation simple proche de zéro avec deux autres variables, qui sont en revanche très corrélées entre elles. Dans ce type de régressions, les paramètres mesurant la...

This paper studies under which conditions the share of profit in value-added, financial constraints on investment and capital shortage may foster unemployment and may limit the growth of capital and/or the growth of aggregate demand, in a stock-flow consistent model. The efficiency of...

We study cooperative games associated with a communication structure which takes into account a level of communication between players. Let us consider an undirected communication graph : each node represents a player and there is an edge between two nodes if the corresponding players can...

We deliver a short overview of di erent centrality measures and influence concepts in social networks, and present the relation-algebraic approach to the concepts of power and influence. First, we briefly discuss four kinds of measures of centrality: the ones based on degree, closeness,...

Cooperation structures without any {\it a priori} assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for mar\-ginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic...