This paper investigates the social preferences over labor market exibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand. We demonstrate that how the economy responds to productivity shocks depends on the power of labor to extract rents and on the status quo level of the firing cost....

We develop a theory of endogenous regimes transitions (with a focus on democratic consolidation), which emphasizes the role of political culture and of its interaction with political institutions. Political culture re?flects the extent of individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy...

We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dy- namic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in...

We analyze the effects of income support on unemployment and welfare dynamics when stigma is attached to welfare provision. Stigma has been modeled in the literature as a cost of welfare participation; in this paper we analyze the effect of income support on unemployment and welfare dynamics by...

Aim of this work is to evaluate the overall effect of social origins on secondary school track enrolment in Italy, Germany and Netherlands, allowing for consistent cross country comparisons. PISA 2003 is employed. Track choices are assumed to depend on student's ability and social origins; since...

In this paper we propose a non-equilibrium model in order to explain the search behavior of unemployed workers. This modeling strategy, framed in a rational choice paradigm, allows us to investigate the effects of negative duration dependence in the out-of-unemployment hazard rate, accounting...

Negative duration dependence in the exit rate from social assistance is an important issue addressed in the dynamic welfare participation literature. If heterogeneity is properly modelled, the decline of the exit rate is ascribed to a progressive reduction of the capability to get off welfare...

We offer a rationale for elections that take place in the shadow of power. Factions unhappy with policy can threaten violence. But when they lack common knowledge about (i) one another's rationality, and (ii) their chances of victory at arms, mutual overconfidence can precipitate civil war. We...

We investigate the effects of income support on unemployment and welfare dynamics when stigma is attached to welfare provision. Stigma has been modelled in the literature as a cost of entry into welfare. Allowing for psychological factors, we assume that with stigma welfare provision leads to...