Similar Search Results

Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2011

equilibrium the first lawyer visited demands a higher contingent fee for lower-valued cases, signaling the caseï¿½s value to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320347

Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - EconWPA - 1994

This paper develops a two-stage model of product design and safety signaling incorporating a parametric liability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407552

Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - EconWPA - 1994

We model the settlement and litigation process, allowing for incomplete information about the level of damages (incurred by the plaintiff) on the part of both the defendant and the court, and use the model to examine the effect of making (currently inadmissible) settlement demands admissible as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118520

Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - EconWPA - 1994

We analyze a settlement and litigation game in which both parties possess private information relevant to the value of a claim. The plaintiff knows the level of damages, while the defendant knows the probability he will be held liable for those damages. We consider two alternatives: (1) the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118617

Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - 2014

We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant when informal sanctions by outside observers (society) may be imposed on both the defendant and the prosecutor. Outside observers rationally use the disposition of the case (plea bargain, case drop, acquittal, or conviction)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144136

Search, Bargaining, and Agency in the Market for Legal Services

Daughety, Andrew F. - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133198

Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2006

paper we show that the combination of multi-agent simultaneous signaling of private information, and the nature of the … commitment to provide greater effort. We find that this non-cooperative, simultaneous signaling need not be wasteful, and can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752717

Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2007

through a credible direct claim; 2) signaling of quality via producer actions that influence buyersÕ beliefs about quality. In … general, these two literatures have ignored one-another. In this paper we argue that disclosure and signaling are two sides of … integration of these two alternatives leads to a number of new implications about disclosure, signaling, firm preferences over …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752756

Privacy, Publicity, and Choice

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2008

We develop and explore a new model of the economics of privacy. Previous work has focused on "privacy of type," wherein an agent privately knows an immutable characteristic. We consider "privacy of action," wherein privacy means that an agent's choice of action is unobservable to others. To show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595886

Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2006

costs that would induce a high-safety firm to choose disclosure over signaling. When the firmï¿½s full marginal cost is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595892