This paper critiques some of the properties of the so-called quot;efficient component pricing rulequot; (ECPR) for access to a bottleneck (monopoly) facility. When a rival and the bottleneck monopolist both produce a complementary component to the bottleneck service, the ECPR specifies that the...

Non-uniform pricing equilibria are shown to dominate uniform pricing equilibria in free entry, monopolistically competitive markets with identical consumers. The non- uniform pricing equilibrium is welfare optimal. Comparisons of Cournot and non-uniform pricing equilibria in terms of the...

We analyze the equilibrium size of networks under alternative market structures. Networks are characterized by positive size externalities (commonly called quot;network externalitiesquot;). That is, the benefits of the addition of an extra node (or an extra customer) exceed the private benefits...

We show that, despite coordination in the quality level of the components that they provide, independent vertically-related (disintegrated) monopolists will provide products of lower quality level than a sole integrated monopolist. Further, the integrated monopolist achieves higher market...

We present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology....

Following up on our initial comments at the Tunney Act proceeding of the proposed merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, we discuss DOJ's criticisms of these comments, explaining why these criticisms are baseless. Moreover, using evidence from the NY v. Deutsche Telecom trial, we provide new...

As economists with significant experience in competition and regulatory matters, we offer comments on the remedies proposed by the Department of Justice to address the competitive effects flowing from the proposed merger of Sprint and T-Mobile, as recognized by the DOJ's Complaint. We find that...