This paper explores a process which I denote as “young workforce disposal” (YWD). YWD reflects the fact that many young people enter the labor market as dependent employees, at some later time they are dismissed and (presumably) move into never-ending unemployment. Long term unemployment may...

L'aggancio tra i dati WHIP e quelli del Casellario degli Attivi consente l'osservazione di tutti i percorsi lavorativi, non solo quelli coperti dai dati INPS (o WHIP). Questa procedura ha permesso di dare una parziale risposta ad una domanda che ci si pone quando si usano i dati WHIP, o di fonte...

In questo rapporto si presentano due informazioni sviluppate partendo dagli archivi degli episodi di lavoro dipendente di WHIP (archivi RL_annui_): gli oneri sociali obbligatori (variabile oneri_sociali) e il costo del lavoro (variabile costo_lavoro). Le stime degli oneri sociali obbligatori e...

A seller dynamically sells a divisible good to a buyer. It is common knowledge that there are gains from trade and that the gains per unit are decreasing. Payoffs are interdependent as in Akerlof's market for lemons. The seller is informed about the good's quality. The buyer makes an offer in...

We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the firm can only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet...

This paper is about very long term unemployment (a more appropriate denomination could be "out-of-official-employment") in Italy, its concentration and the process of young worker disposal, an important, yet unexplored, determinant. “Very long” is not just “long”: we are dealing with...

We study the relative performance of disclosure and auditing in organizations. We consider the information transmission problem between two decision makers who take actions at dates 1 and 2 respectively. The first decision maker has private information about a state of nature that is relevant...

We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms in which, unlike with...

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...