We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show …

We examine the effects of a novel political institution, which we call Coalition- Preclusion Contracts, on elections …, policies, and welfare. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts enable political parties to credibly commit before the elections not to … form a coalition after the elections with one or several other parties specified in the contract. We consider a political …

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts, a novel instrument, on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts …

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show …

democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts …

anonymous elections in democracies. …

contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while …

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …