We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation...

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be...

The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on a certain issue. It is assumed that each agent is inclined to make a particular decision, but due to a possible influence of the others, his final decision may be different from his initial inclination. Since in...

Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions. In this paper, we provide a fairly...

This paper argues that mainstream economic the- ory, far from providing an indisputable plea in favor of shareholder value-maximization, o ers striking arguments showing quite the opposite: pro t maximization cannot be a legitimate prioritar- ian goal for private rms. This opens the door for a...

This paper provides a new framework for monetary macro-policy, where the Central Bank potentially intervenes both on short-term and long-term loans markets, and can do this alternatively by manipulating interest rates or money supply. Following Bonnisseau and Orntangar (2010) and Giraud and...

The paper concerns a dynamic model of influence in which agents have to make a yes-no decision. Each agent has an initial opinion, which he may change during different phases of interaction, due to mutual influence among agents. The influence mechanism is assumed to be stochastic and to follow a...

We study cooperative games associated with a communication structure which takes into account a level of communication between players. Let us consider an undirected communication graph : each node represents a player and there is an edge between two nodes if the corresponding players can...

We deliver a short overview of di erent centrality measures and influence concepts in social networks, and present the relation-algebraic approach to the concepts of power and influence. First, we briefly discuss four kinds of measures of centrality: the ones based on degree, closeness,...

Cooperation structures without any {\it a priori} assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for mar\-ginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic...