This paper explores a process which I denote as “young workforce disposal” (YWD). YWD reflects the fact that many young people enter the labor market as dependent employees, at some later time they are dismissed and (presumably) move into never-ending unemployment. Long term unemployment may...

L'aggancio tra i dati WHIP e quelli del Casellario degli Attivi consente l'osservazione di tutti i percorsi lavorativi, non solo quelli coperti dai dati INPS (o WHIP). Questa procedura ha permesso di dare una parziale risposta ad una domanda che ci si pone quando si usano i dati WHIP, o di fonte...

In questo rapporto si presentano due informazioni sviluppate partendo dagli archivi degli episodi di lavoro dipendente di WHIP (archivi RL_annui_): gli oneri sociali obbligatori (variabile oneri_sociali) e il costo del lavoro (variabile costo_lavoro). Le stime degli oneri sociali obbligatori e...

This paper is about very long term unemployment (a more appropriate denomination could be "out-of-official-employment") in Italy, its concentration and the process of young worker disposal, an important, yet unexplored, determinant. “Very long” is not just “long”: we are dealing with...

The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the...

This paper explores the “disposable” patterns of workforce utilization in Italy. The term “disposable” reflects the fact that people enter the labor market, their services are “used” as a disposable commodity for few years, after which they leave the labor market and are no longer...

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for...

In a common-values election with two candidates voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior. They can acquire information that improves the precision of the signal. Electors differ in their information acquisition costs. For large electorates a non negligible fraction of voters...

We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the first calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research insti- tution. This requirement was...