likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims’ demand for public services, raising bribery … indirectly, and also increases victims’ propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims … are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of …

In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care … in Peru and Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care … to a bribery rate of 17%. The income elasticity of the bribe amount cannot be precisely estimated in Peru, but is about 0 …

bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of … that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the … battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of …

more often, and among users, the rich are more likely to bribe. The benefit of bribery is avoidance of the poor service … delivered to clients who refuse to bribe. …

bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of … that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the … battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of …

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the … of official. Compared to a client dealing with an honest official, a client who pays a bribe has a similar probability of … concluding her business, while a client who refuses to bribe has a probability 16 percentage points lower. This indicates that …

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the … of official. Compared to a client dealing with an honest official, a client who pays a bribe has a similar probability of … concluding her business, while a client who refuses to bribe has a probability 16 percentage points lower. This indicates that …

institutions. The characteristics of officials' clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts … rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that … bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would …

likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery … indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims … are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of …

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the … of official. Compared to a client dealing with an honest official, a client who pays a bribe has a similar probability of … concluding her business, while a client who refuses to bribe has a probability 16 percentage points lower. This indicates that …