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In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539675
Agency theory emphasizes that separating ownership and control can lead to inefficiencies in corporations, but the literature on strategic delegation points out that the owner will profit from this separation due to advantages from self-commitment. In this paper, both literatures are combined....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029242
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contests. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117869