We estimate the determinants of various types of product innovation. Knowledge spillovers from rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations. This impact is largely independent of the participation in R&D cooperations. Spillovers exert no such independent influence on drastic...

We investigate the effect of profit-sharing on product and process innovation. Profit-sharing is a credible commitment of the companies to let the employees participate in any efficiency gain. Resistance against technical progress becomes less plausible. Moreover, employees are stimulated to...

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

Simple models of competition for the market with endogenous entry show that, contrary to the Arrow view, an endogenous entry threat in a market induces the average firm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent leader to invest more. We test these predictions based on a unique dataset and survey...

We estimate the effect of R&D spillovers on sales realized by products new to the firm (imitation) and new to the market (innovation). It turns out that spillovers from rivals lead to more imitation, while input from customers and research institutions enhance original innovation.

We estimate the effect of R&D spillovers on sales realized by products new to the firm (imitation) and new to the market (innovation). It turns out that spillovers from rivals lead to more imitation, while inputs from customers and research institutions enhance original innovation.

his paper discusses the incentives for innovation when liability is limited or not. Clearly innovative activity involves risk. On the one hand, the risk of firm owners is limited if their liability is limited. On the other hand, credits will be more difficult to receive if liability is limited....

We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, contrary to the Arrow view, endogenous entry threat in a market induces the average firm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent leader to invest more than the average firm. We test these predictions with a Tobit model...

In dieser Arbeit werden die verschiedenen Anreize für Manager zur Durchführung von Innovationsprojekten im Vergleich zu denjenigen von Unternehmenseignern untersucht. Für einen Manager bestehen gegenläufige Anreize Innovationen intensiver oder weniger intensiv zu verfolgen als Eigner....

We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, contrary to the Arrow view, endogenous entry threat in a market induces the average firm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent leader to invest more. We test these predictions with a Tobit model based on a unique dataset...