This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning...

Simple models of competition for the market with endogenous entry show that, contrary to the Arrow view, an endogenous entry threat in a market induces the average firm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent leader to invest more. We test these predictions based on a unique dataset and survey...

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

We analyze the impact of subsidies on R&D expenditures in the financial crisis and beyond. The financial crisis has led to considerable turmoil in financing and, as a result, to restrictions of firms' access to external financing. Utilizing this fact, we identify and analyze financing...

Successful innovative activity is a major contribution to the intangible capital of firms. Although its importance is generally acknowledged, the contribution to companies' profits is a priori unclear. We present the results of an empirical study on the effects of the patent stock on...

In this paper we investigate the relevance of bargaining institutions for the decline of the labor share. Several explanations for the decline exist, which consider the relevance of technology, globalization and markups. Neglected so far is the influence of bargaining institutions, in particular...

In this paper we investigate the relevance of bargaining institutions for the decline of the labor share. Several explanations for the decline exist, which consider the relevance of technology, globalization and markups. Neglected so far is the influence of bargaining institutions, in particular...

Codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor. Based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is...

Codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor. Based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is...

Codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor. Based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is...