aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is … production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under …

. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can …

agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual …

economic explanation for this paradox, linked to the multitasking problem in managing family firms. We compare the performance … of family and non-family managers in a moral-hazard model with imperfect performance measures, where managerial tasks are …-economic goals. However, the more complementary the tasks, the more aligned the performance measure with the family's goals, and the …

value and an imperfect performance measure. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different …. While imperfect performance measures are always harmful under multitasking, they may in fact increase profit under …

I compare group to individual performance pay when workers are envious and performance is non-verifiable. Avoiding …

. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects an agent's individual contribution to firm …