Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard-conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non-discriminatory...

This paper studies third degree price discrimination in a monopolistically competitive market. When the number of firms is fixed, price discrimination raises firm profit and reduces consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing. In the long run, the equilibrium product variety under price...

This paper studies the welfare effects of location space constraints when the duopoly sellers are vertically separated. As the downstream firms respond to higher input prices by locating further away from the center of the market, constraining them to locate within the linear city allows the...

This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant seeks to enter some or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and, on the contrary, we find that...

We relax two common assumptions in the Hotelling model with third-degree price discrimination: inelastic demand and exogenously assumed price discrimination. Based on the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) representative consumer model, we allow firms to endogenously choose whether to...

This paper assesses the profit and welfare effects of firms' ability to charge personalized prices in markets where consumer demand is sensitive to price changes. In a mill pricing model, regardless of demand elasticity, personalized pricing (PP) raises consumer surplus at the expense of...

Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in which a downstream manufacturer holds non-controlling stakes in its rival and both buy input from an unptream monopolist. We find...