In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...

The impact of wage increases on job satisfaction is explored theoretically and empirically. To do this, we apply a utility function that rises with the absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. It is shown that when employees can influence their wages by exerting effort, myopic utility...

We derive a natural definition of responsibility in a formal model where employees care for their career prospects: A superior holds a subordinate responsible for a task, when she announces her beliefs that this subordinate contributes most to this task. We show, that those announced beliefs...

The impact of wage increases on job satisfaction is explored. First, it is empirically confirmed that current job satisfaction rises with the absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. Second, a basic job satisfaction function is constructed based on the empirical results, and...

It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...

In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

The impact of wage increases on job satisfaction are explored. First, it is empirically established that current job satisfaction rises with absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. Second, a basic job satisfaction function is constructed based on the empirical results, and...

We study the impact of wage increases on job satisfaction theoretically and empirically. To do this, we apply a utility function that rises with the absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. We show that when employees can influence their wages by exerting effort, myopic utility...

We examine the question whether a decision should be delegated to a subordinate and whether this is done efficiently. We illustrate in a dynamic principal-agent model that delegation is useful for several reasons. First, it serves to test agents with unknown ability. Then, it may improve an...