Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the...

We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...

We combine a model of combined inter-spatial and inter-temporal trade between countries recently used by Huang, Whalley and Zhang (2004) to analyze the merits of trade liberalization in services when goods trade is restricted with a model of foreign exchange rationing due to Clarete and Whalley...

We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...

We combine a model of combined inter-spatial and inter-temporal trade between countries recently used by Huang, Whalley and Zhang (2004) to analyze the merits of trade liberalization in services when goods trade is restricted with a model of foreign exchange rationing due to Clarete and Whalley...