We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex- post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new tech- nology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a...

We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower...

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a usergroup. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe...

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium...

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a user-group. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem -- i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they...

We consider a dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. The incumbent platform enjoys a focal position such that consumers expect other consumers to join it, while the entrant platform may enjoy a quality advantage. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that...