Based on the LEN-model KRAPP (1999, 2000) analyses for different constellations howcollusive behaviour of agents influences the principal’s welfare. We try to complement this analysisby considering additional scenarios. Furthermore, we take into account that the principal cannot ap-praise...

Owing to changes in the business environment, there has been a tremendous adoption of innovativeworkplace organisation (WO) and human resource (HR) practices during the last fewdecades. Assuming a holistic perspective on human resource management (HRM), the presentstudy establishes the...

Das Konzept des persönlichen Informationsmanagements (PIM) wird in diesem Arbeitpapier als notwendige Ergänzung strategischer und operativer Ansätze des Informationsmanagements entfaltet.Der Bezeichnung entsprechend wird eine personelle Sichtweise eingenommen, die den...

In diesem Arbeitspapier werden Regelwerke betrachtet, aus denen rechtliche Vorgaben für die IT des Unternehmens resultieren. Dies umfasst Gesetze und Rechtsverordnungen, Verwaltungsvorschriften, referenzierte Regelwerke und Urteile sowie Verträge. Die wichtigsten in der Praxis relevanten und...

Globalisierung und Deregulierung bringen den Unternehmen in vielerlei Hinsichtneue Möglichkeiten, ihr wirtschaftliches Handeln zu optimieren. Aber sowie durch diesen schnellen Wandel und die steigende Komplexität von Geschäftenmehr Optionen entstehen, werden auch immer mehr neuartige...

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, whichprovides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use thelessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance inpractice....

Little is known about the relationship between family firms and their employees. This paper aims to close this gap. We distinguish between family management and family ownership as two dimensions of family firms and analyze their respective influence on downsizing. Our findings show that family...

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expectedto be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompetingexplanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of boardmonitoring is hidden in stock price...

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...