This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms...

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financial frictions, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability. In this paper,...

This paper studies the pricing implications of the sole ambiguity aversion, in a Lucas’ tree economy where asset returns are ambiguous. Abstracting from a specific functional form, we disentangle the model-specific effect from the effect of ambiguity aversion. In addition, we allow the...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...

This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of the Smooth Ambiguity decision model developed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). A key feature of the model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs,...

This paper presents a theory in which risk-averse heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs are the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation. Entrepreneurial skills are private information, which prevents full risk sharing. In that setup, development to a modern industrial...

We introduce and axiomatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the variational preferences we axiomatized in [21], which generalize the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [9], and include the Multiplier Preferences inspired by robust control and first used...

I present a theory of development in which heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs require credit to start new projects and open new sectors. As the variety of sectors expands during development, the allocation of entrepreneurial talent improves. A key result of the paper is to show that, in...