This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms...

This paper examines if (and how) continuous-time trading renders dynamically-complete a financial market in which the underlying risk process is a Brownian motion and the securities pay dividends that are proportional to geometric Brownian motions. A sufficient condition, that the instantaneous...

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financial frictions, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability. In this paper,...

This paper studies the pricing implications of the sole ambiguity aversion, in a Lucas’ tree economy where asset returns are ambiguous. Abstracting from a specific functional form, we disentangle the model-specific effect from the effect of ambiguity aversion. In addition, we allow the...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...

We show that the introduction in a power utility function of a confidence index to sig- nal the state of the world allows for an otherwise standard asset pricing model to match the observed consumption growth volatility and excess returns with a reasonable level of relative risk aversion. Our...

This paper presents a theory in which risk-averse heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs are the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation. Entrepreneurial skills are private information, which prevents full risk sharing. In that setup, development to a modern industrial...