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This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010241591
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This paper examines if (and how) continuous-time trading renders dynamically-complete a financial market in which the underlying risk process is a Brownian motion and the securities pay dividends that are proportional to geometric Brownian motions. A sufficient condition, that the instantaneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185963
Currently, financial economics is unable to predict changes in asset prices with respect to changes in the underlying risk factors, even when an asset's dividend is independent of a given factor. This paper takes steps towards addressing this issue by highlighting a crucial component of wealth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904123
This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904139
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010241593
The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financial frictions, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability. In this paper,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008692944
We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751629
This paper presents a theory in which risk-averse heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs are the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation. Entrepreneurial skills are private information, which prevents full risk sharing. In that setup, development to a modern industrial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094055