This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms...

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financial frictions, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability. In this paper,...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...

The aim of this paper is to describe a method to introduce empirical data in agent based models. Starting from the econometric and calibration literature, it is shown how to select the values of the parameters in the model and which conditions has to be met to have consistent estimations. A...

What is the relationship, if any, between Experimental Economics and Agent-based Computational Economics? Experimental Economics (EXP) investigates individual behaviour (and the emergence of aggregate regularities) by means of human subject experiments. Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE),...

This paper presents a non-equilibrium, agent-based model of workers and firms, with on-the-job searching, endogenous entrepreneurial decisions and endogenous wage and income determination. Workers and firms are heterogeneous, and learn their strategy in the labor market. The model is able to...

An urn-ball probabilistic model of the labour market is developed. Agents can be employed, (voluntary or involuntary) unemployed or entrepreneurs. The analytical long run equilibrium probabilities for each state and the matching function are derived. Then, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are...

Multiplicative models of firm dynamics ‘à la Gibrat’ have become a standard reference in industrial organization. However, some unpleasant properties of their implied dynamics – namely, their explosive or implosive behaviour (firm size and number collapsing to zero or increasing...