There are many important decision problems where learning through experimentation is costly or impossible. In these situations, individuals may try to learn from observing the outcomes of others who have made similar decisions. Often, however, information about others comprises a selected...

Interacting agents in finance represent a behavioral, agent-based approach in which financial markets are viewed as complex adaptive systems consisting of many boundedly rational agents interacting through simple heterogeneous investment strategies, constantly adapting their behavior in response...

This paper extends choice theory by allowing for the interaction between cognitive costs and imitative dynamics. The authors experimentally investigate the role of imitation when participants face a task which is costly in cognitive terms. In order to disentangle different choice dynamics, they...

We develop a behavioral theory of real options that relaxes the informational and behavioral assumptions underlying applications of financial options theory to real assets. To do so, we augment real option theory's focus on uncertain future asset values (prospective uncertainty) with feedback...

We propose a general equilibrium model where two special interest groups (SIGs) compete to influence public opinion. Citizens with heterogeneous priors over a binary state of the world receive reports drawn from a continuous message space by a variety of sources. The two opposite SIGs attempt to...

I construct a state space model with unawareness following Aumann (1976). Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) show that standard state space models are incapable of representing unawareness. The model circumvents the impossibility result by endowing the agent with a subjective state space that...

Why do lawyers in some jurisdictions continue to ‘automatically’ exclude the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in their choices of law for international sales contracts? Why do lawyers in other jurisdictions approach the decision very differently? Why...

This paper proves Li (2009) unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988). For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent...