Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

This paper examines the relationship between CEOs’ individualistic cultural background and corporate innovation among firms in the United States. Using hand-collected data on birthplaces of US-born CEOs, we provide robust evidence that CEOs born in frontier counties with a higher level of...

We examine the effect of technology spillovers on the duration of executive compensation contracts. We find that in the presence of greater technology spillovers, firms tend to grant longer duration compensation contracts to their executives. This finding is consistent with theoretical...

This paper provides highly significant evidence that golden parachutes spur innovation in concentrated-ownership corporations and State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs). Taking advantage of China's institutional features, we find that golden parachutes lead to higher levels of innovation quantity and...

This study examines the effect of CEO inside debt compensation on firm innovation. CEO inside debt compensation comprises deferred compensation and pension benefits. We find that CEO pension benefits negatively and significantly impact the number of patent applications in the following year and...

This paper investigates the impacts of CEOs’ research experiences on corporate innovation, and shows that the firms managed by researcher CEOs have significantly higher investments in innovative activities, generate better innovation output as measured by the number of patents and citations,...

We exploit exogenous variations in CEO turnover to investigate the influence of successor CEOs on corporate innovation. Using difference-in-differences (DID) and a battery of robustness tests, our results reveal that CEO turnover matters and triggers economically significant improvements in both...

I examine CEO compensation in outsourcing firms, using a new database of purchase obligations from firm 10-Ks. I find that the intensity of outsourcing can significantly explain the variations in CEO compensation; the more the firms do outsourcing, the more they pay to their CEOs. Outsourcing...

Prior research has identified individual characteristics that distinguish business owners from non-business owners. We tested our contention that not every successful business owner can be characterized by such typical ldquo;entrepreneurialrdquo; characteristics. Multiple Analysis of Variance...