Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG)...

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an...

The present paper analyses the role played by risk aversion in the reconciling of agricultural income and biodiversity. A bio-economic mode which articulates bird community dynamics and representative farmers selecting land uses within an uncertain macro-economic context is developed. It is...

Наибольший объем задач по осуществлению инфраструктурной поддержки предпринимательской деятельности приходится на государственный сектор, который...

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that...

This study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods. In order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency, we extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (Am Polit Sci Rev 101:79–92, <CitationRef...</citationref>

The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) ismeasured. In the second part couples play 25 periods of a public good game. In...

We analyze the efect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the...

This paper considers a growth model with migrants who do not own capital. The income of domestic residents and their welfare increase with the number of migrants. Then, a public good is introduced. Migrants do not contribute to its financing but induce congestion effects and decrease the quality...