A seller dynamically sells a divisible good to a buyer. It is common knowledge that there are gains from trade and that the gains per unit are decreasing. Payoffs are interdependent as in Akerlof's market for lemons. The seller is informed about the good's quality. The buyer makes an offer in...

This paper investigates the effect of potential competition on takeovers which we model as a bargaining game with alternating offers where calling an auction represents an outside option for each bidder at each stage of the game. The model aims to answer three main questions: who wins the...

The aim of this paper is to describe a method to introduce empirical data in agent based models. Starting from the econometric and calibration literature, it is shown how to select the values of the parameters in the model and which conditions has to be met to have consistent estimations. A...

We model a situation in which two countries are involved in a dispute. The dispute can end in a peaceful settlement, or it can escalate to war. If it is common knowledge that the countries are strategically rational, then the only equilibrium outcome of the model is peace. If, on the other hand,...

We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms in which, unlike with...

What is the relationship, if any, between Experimental Economics and Agent-based Computational Economics? Experimental Economics (EXP) investigates individual behaviour (and the emergence of aggregate regularities) by means of human subject experiments. Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE),...

We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...

This paper presents a non-equilibrium, agent-based model of workers and firms, with on-the-job searching, endogenous entrepreneurial decisions and endogenous wage and income determination. Workers and firms are heterogeneous, and learn their strategy in the labor market. The model is able to...

An urn-ball probabilistic model of the labour market is developed. Agents can be employed, (voluntary or involuntary) unemployed or entrepreneurs. The analytical long run equilibrium probabilities for each state and the matching function are derived. Then, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are...

Multiplicative models of firm dynamics ‘à la Gibrat’ have become a standard reference in industrial organization. However, some unpleasant properties of their implied dynamics – namely, their explosive or implosive behaviour (firm size and number collapsing to zero or increasing...