We examine the timing and quality of product introduction in an R&D stopping game, where we allow for horizontal and vertical differentiation in the product market. We observe that discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as firms' abilities as researchers change. Further, when the...

If a product has two dimensions of quality, one observable and one not, a firm can use observable quality as a signal of unobservable quality. The correlation between consumers' valuation of high quality in each dimension is a key determinant of the feasibility of such signaling. A firm may use...

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77-99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks' profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case in...

In der psychologischen Vertragsforschung wird davon ausgegangen, dass der psychologische Vertrag von Arbeitnehmern einem grundlegenden Wandel unterliegt: Ein eher an Langfristigkeit orientierter relationaler psychologischer Vertrag wird zunehmend abgelöst durch einen eher kurzfristorientierten...