legality with that under alternative standards. We find that the rule of per se legality induces maximal collusion among … settling companies. In comparison, the rule of per se illegality entirely prevents collusion and the rule of reason induces … limited collusion when antitrust enforcement is subject to error. Contrary to intuition, limited collusion can be welfare …

legality with that under alternative standards. We find that the rule of per se legality induces maximal collusion among … settling companies. In comparison, the rule of per se illegality entirely prevents collusion and the rule of reason induces … limited collusion when antitrust enforcement is subject to error. Contrary to intuition, limited collusion can be welfare …

compared to the underlying litigations. We find that the rule of per se legality induces maximal collusion among settling … when antitrust enforcement is subject to error. Contrary to intuition, limited collusion can be welfare enhancing as it …

a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would maximize consumer welfare and …

a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would maximize consumer welfare and …

oligopolistic tacit collusion as such, but that reputes abusive a set of tactics adopted by tacitly colluding oligopolists exposed … to disruption. As much as deviation is an internal force likely to undermine tacit collusion, disruption is a powerful … tacit collusion (I). Second, it describes how disruption can undermine tacit collusion, and what oligopolists can do to …