This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms...

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...

I establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the securities' market to be dynamically-complete in a single-commodity, pure-exchange economy with many Lucas' trees whose dividends are geometric Brownian motions. Even though my analysis is based upon the representative-agent version of...

Due to wealth effects, the price of a security may vary with the realization of an underlying risk factor even when the security's dividend is independent of that factor. This paper highlights a crucial component of these effects hitherto ignored by the literature: changes in wealth do not alter...