For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and …-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and …-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional … inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and inefficient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct …

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional … inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and inefficient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct …