This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes …

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes …

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …

contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each … component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …